Voter Examination

1 Introduction

John Stuart Mill, an influential economist and philosopher in the nineteenth century, argued that democracy enlightens, empowers, and activates the public, making them smart and conscientious compared to the people living under authoritarian governments, who are commonly dumb and indifferent. He (1861) also suggested that electoral democracy produces better results with the intelligence of the citizens, so a utilitarianist or consequentialist will also favor democracy. Mill’s theory of democracy has become the fundamental hypothesis of modern democratic systems. However, there were few democracies one hundred and fifty years ago, while evidence nowadays tends to support Joseph Schumpeter (2003)’s statement on democracy: “The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes primitive again”. Modern political scientist Jason Brennan (2016) also concluded that: “most forms of political engagement not only fail to educate or ennoble us but also tend to stultify and corrupt us.” Perhaps, Western liberal democracy is not “the end of history” as Francis Fukuyama (2018) used to believe. In addition, English sociologist Colin Crouch (2000) suggests the idea of “post-democracy”, looking for the possibility after the age of democracy. This essay not only compares the theoretical frameworks and assumptions of electoral and deliberative democracy to the political reality in Western democracies, but also formulates a system of voter education and examination as a better political structure in place of electoral democracy with universal suffrage.

2 Failure of Deliberation in Western Democracies 

Deliberative democracy has become a popular democratic theory. Theorists of deliberative democracy “rely on dialogue and debate between engaged citizens” and praise the “public use of reason as the means by which decisions affecting public matters ought to be reached” (Rothschild, 2014). This form of democracy is believed to be an inclusive form of decision-making that recognizes “the value of mutual respect,” “encourage[s] public-spirited perspectives on public issues,” “expand[s] [the citizen’s] knowledge,” and achieves the common good (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004).

However, when the concept of deliberative democracy is popularized in electorate democracies with universal suffrage and public political discourse is encouraged, the specific frameworks and preconditions of deliberation proposed by scholars are often overlooked. In John Rawls (1997)’ theory of deliberative democracy, participants are “free and equal” citizens who also view others as so. They are also morally obligated to accept “the criterion of reciprocity” and tolerate the difference in “comprehensive doctrines.” In addition, James Fishkin and Robert Luskin (2005) argued that deliberation should be “informed,” “balanced,” “conscientious,” “substantive,” and “comprehensive.” Joshua Cohen (1989), Amy Gutmann, and Dennis F. Thompson (2004) also have slightly different outlines, but the requirements of participants also revolve around being equal, informed, independent, respectful, committed, and open-minded. In this section, the essay argues that these preconditions are generally unmet in Western democracies. As a result, the use of public reasoning in politics does not produce as much good as supporters of deliberative democracy project. Furthermore, the practices of public deliberation and representative democracy with universal suffrage were inherently incompatible and such combination erodes the very preconditions of deliberation mentioned above and further divides the society.

2.1 Voters are not Equal: Inequality in Socioeconomic and Political Power

In his Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville (1840) conducted that equality was the cornerstone of the successful democracy in nineteenth-century America. He found that most Americans at the time were self-employed farmers who are racially, religiously, socioeconomically homogenous and enjoyed a similar fraction of political power and responsibility. In 1889, nonetheless, James Bryce has already noticed the growing inequality in America: “sixty years ago [in the time of de Tocqueville] there were no great fortunes in America, few large fortunes, no poverty. Now there is some poverty, many large fortunes, and a greater number of gigantic fortunes than in any other country of the world” (Goldin & Katz, 2007). This trend continued: the top 1% of wealth holders in the United States owned 30% of the total wealth in 1920; this number was close to 40% in 1980 (Keister & Moller, 2000) and it is still increasing (Wolff. 2017).

Today, the socioeconomic structures in the West have become increasingly complexified. The advance in globalization, industrialization, and automation sophisticated the division of labour and diversified individual’s social roles and perceived realities. Such a difference in socioeconomic power can easily translate into political power. According to Edward Foley (1994), “rich citizens . . . have a greater opportunity than poor citizens to attempt to persuade undecided voters to agree with their positions” because money is paid “for the publicity and advertising.” Additionally, socioeconomic disparity forms exclusion; it puts “the more prestigious members of [a] society and the dominant racial or gender group in a democracy” on one side and “the ‘lower’ classes and a subordinated racial or gender group on the other” (Rothschild, 2014). In Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America, Gilens also found that “presidents are about six times more responsive to the policy preferences of the rich than the poor” (Brennan, 2016). The upshot of this is that the election results may not faithfully represent voters’ intentions equally as unequal power skews or even bypassed deliberation. Besides the unequal political influence, socioeconomic diversities also affect the level of information people possess and their political identities and attitudes towards others, which this essay will later explore.

2.2 Voters are not Free: Partisan Influence in Determining Political Preferences

In Joshua Cohen (1989)’s “ideal deliberative procedure,” “participants regard themselves as bound only by the results of [and the preconditions for] that deliberation” and “[t]heir consideration of proposals is not constrained by the authority of prior norms or requirements.” Even though citizens may regard themselves as free from outside forces when deliberating, one way to expose this as an illusion is to understand how different factors play out in forming political preferences. 

In their Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public, Donald Kinder and Nathan Kalmoe (2017) challenged the assumption that ideology is the largest determinant of preferences on policies. They found that only “about 17 percent of the public could both assign the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ correctly to the parties and say something sensible about what the terms meant.” Moreover, they concluded that “ideological differences have little influence over opinion on immigration, affirmative action, capital punishment, gun control, Social Security, health insurance, the deficit, foreign aid, tax reform, and the war on terrorism.” What actually determines average voters’ political stands is their party affiliation. When assessing “stability and change of ideological identification” and “party identification,” party identification is also much more stable than ideological identification, which means that voters more often vote along the party lines than vote according to their ideologies. As Jason Brennan put it: “[f]or the typical Democrat, the thinking is more ‘People like me vote Democrat, and Democrats are pro-choice, so I’m pro-choice’ than it is ‘I’m pro-choice so I’ll vote Democrat’” (2018). The authors of The American Voter also concluded that party identification is a “durable attachment, not readily disturbed by passing events and personalities” (Campbell et al, 1960). Therefore, partisanship is an inner identity that consistently prevents citizens from impartial and rational reasoning; in this sense, they are never free. 

2.3 Voters are not Informed: Ignorance of Average Voters

Sufficient empirical studies had shown the surprisingly low level of information voters and non-voters possess. In 1992, American National Election Studies (ANES) designed a wide range of questions to measure the public’s political information. The results were astonishing: only half of the respondents were right to identify that “the Republican Party favored reducing government services and increasing defense spending more than the Democratic Party,” on which Scott Althaus (2013) commented: “[f]lipping a coin would have produced comparable results.” Abortion rights were a more notable and controversial, but “only 59% of respondents were able to say that Bill Clinton was relatively more prochoice than George Bush” (Althaus, 2013). Unfortunately, voters did not become more informed as time passed. Eight years later, in 2000, ANES showed that less than half of the voters knew that Al Gore “was more supportive of abortion rights, more supportive of welfare state programs, favored a higher degree of aid to blacks, or was more supportive of environmental regulation than Bush” (Brennan, 2016). These pieces of evidence are not isolated, other surveys and studies also, more often than not, labeled American citizens as ignorant (Bennett, 1988; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Caplan, 2007; Converse, 1964, 1970; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Ilya Somin, 2013; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Neuman, 1986; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Popkin & Dimock, 1999; Price, 1999; Smith, 1989); for the space limit, this essay does not introduce all of them. At last, Ilya Somin (2004) concluded that “[t]he sheer depth of most individual voters’ ignorance is shocking to many observers not familiar with the research” and “25 percent to 35 percent of the American public” is “know-nothings.”

2.4 Voters are not rational: Rational Irrationality in Politics

There is plenty of evidence of irrational voters in Bryan Caplan (2001)’s The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies and other studies, but this paragraph intends to dive deeper into the root of irrationality in politics. Caplan was the first to popularize the concept of rational irrationality in politics. In The Myth of the Rational Voter, one conclusion he made was that the reason why people do not reason rationally and competently in the sphere of politics is not their cognitive inability to understand issues but the lack of incentives to do so. Politics matters, but one vote simply does not. The odds of one individual vote being decisive in the 2008 United States presidential election is 1 in 60 million (Edlin, Gelman, & Silver, 2008), which is even lower than the chance—1 in approximately 29 million—to pay $5 and win a Lotto 6/49 jackpot for at least $15 million (“Lotteries; What are the odds,” 2009). Hence, investing a great amount of time in analyzing social scientific knowledge and theory is apparently not cost-effective. One counting on his vote altering the election outcome is much more economically irrational than another one investing 5 USD in the lottery and expecting to become a multi-millionaire.

If voters make a bet of one million before the election on whether the unemployment rate will drop, they may be willing to learn more economic knowledge objectively for the accessible reward. If twelfth-grade students have to deal with the counterarguments justly for the sake of their marks, they will be glad to do so. However, when the reward is simply not there, why should the voters be mindful of the unpleasant arguments from the other side? This is the question Jason Brennan (2016) asked in his Against Democracy. He kept on comparing the mental and social state of being impartial with that of being biased and irrational: acquiring information that may disprove one’s pre-existing ideas is painful and frustrating while staying in a cozy echo chamber is harmless and one can even make long-term and in their regard trustworthy friends who have similar political preferences. Therefore, when accessing political information, it is also rational for citizens to deploy motivated reasoning, which “is a form of implicit emotion regulation in which the brain converges on judgments that minimize negative and maximize positive affect states associated with threat to or attainment of motives” (Westen et al., 2006). Unsurprisingly, motivated reasoning is also associated with political activeness. In such a manner, seemingly irrational political behaviour is precisely rational for average voters; this is a systematic flaw in democracy with universal suffrage that effectively obstructs rational deliberation.

2.5 Hate Crimes, Systematic Misinformation, Trump’s Presidency, and Brexit Referendum: How the Failure of Deliberation is Plaguing Western Democracies

According to deliberative democratic theory, racism, as a theory that lacks scientific support (Chou, 2017), would soon be abandoned as citizens engage in public deliberation, which, however, is not supported by empirical evidence. Traditional democracies like the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada all encountered increasing numbers of hate crimes (O’Neill , 2017; Levin, 2018; Gaudet, 2018). Racial hate crimes in the US and the UK surged after Trump’s presidency and the EU referendum respectively (Ravani, 2018; Weaver, 2018). Increases in “overt white nationalism” and “racist discourse” were also found in the United States (Feagin & Ducey, 2019). Such a backlash originated from the xenophobic and populist forces that contributed to both Trump’s Presidency and Brexit (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). 

Meanwhile, studies showed that voters’ inequality, partisan influence, ignorance (misinformation), and irrationality led to these two political events. Firstly, supporters of Trump and Brexit tended to be older, poorer, and less educated (Jones, 2018; Barr, 2016). Trump’s Presidency was also described as a “revolt of rural voters” and the feeling of economic and social marginalization contributed to Trump’s support as well (Stud, 2017). In “The Brexit Environment Demands that Deliberative Democracy Meets Inclusive Growth”, Barber (2017) drew a similar conclusion and regarded Brexit as a failure of deliberative democracy and a result of economic inequality. It can be inferred that old age, poverty, and low levels of education were positively correlated to the lack of political knowledge and systematic misinformation, which further correlated to certain policy preferences (this correlation will be discussed in detail in the next section). Even though EU citizens only made up 5% of the total UK population in 2016, remain voters and leave voters respectively thought that 10% and 20% of the UK population were EU immigrants (Ipsos, 2016). Leave voters were also more likely to claim that European immigrants receive a higher value of welfare benefits and services than the amount of taxes they pay, increase crime levels, lower the quality of healthcare services, and result in the unemployment among lower-skilled workers, while the reports by the UK Authority disproved all these claims (Ipsos, 2018). Moreover, voters’ strong adherence to their parties also escalated the political campaigns of misinformation; in both the US and the UK, they voluntarily accepted and spread false or hyperpartisan information that fit their partisan narratives (Berinsky et al, 2017; Bastos & Mercea, 2017). After connecting all the dots, it is clear that the presidency of Trump and Brexit referendum were the results of irrational and xenophobic populist movements that were fueled with economic insecurity, misinformation, and partisan thinking. 

2.6 Identity Politics and Civic Enemy: The War of All Against All

Some may readily attribute the presidency of Trump and Brexit to racism, which is not entirely false. But what these two incidents actually implied is a greater challenge to our society—identity politics. Francis Fukuyama, known for declaring Western liberal democracy “the end of history”, now admits that “[t]wenty five years ago, I didn’t have a sense or a theory about how democracies can go backward . . . . [a]nd I think they clearly can” (Tharoor, 2017). In his essay “Against Identity Politics”, he describes identity politics as “the new tribalism and the crisis of democracy” because “again and again, groups have come to believe that their identities—whether national, religious, ethnic, sexual, gender, or otherwise—are not receiving adequate recognition” (Fukuyama, 2018). He also believes that “the success of populist nationalism in elections held in 2016 by two of the world’s most durable liberal democracies” was a symbol of escalating identity politics. All of the factors mentioned in the last paragraph—economic state, partisanship, races, nationalities—were all the identities that these voters considered indispensable; and irrationality and the spread of hyperpartisan information were the outcomes. The most dangerous consequence of identity politics is that it overturns one of the very basis of democratic deliberation: seeing others as free and equal. In this case, the goal of many deliberations is not to achieve the common good but to identify and exclude enemies or the “not-worthy.”

Fukuyama’s distress over identity politics is supported by empirical evidence. Cass Sunstein (2014) first introduced the term partyism to describe the “hostility and prejudice that operates across political lines.” She states that both explicit and implicit partyism are nowadays more common than explicit and implicit racism. Only 4% to 5% of the Republicans or Democrats in the 1960s would be displeased if their children married someone who affiliates with opposing party, while this ratio became 49%/33% among the Republicans or Democrats in 2014. This trend is opposite to that of racism. The same study also indicated that Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes also (2012) found that “[b]etween 1960 and 2008, stereotyping of partisan supporters and opponents increased exponentially,” “Americans[’] in-party bias—the tendency to view one’s party more favorably than the opposition—climbed from 0.47 to 2.86,” and “Democrats and Republicans were nearly fifty percent more likely to associate negative traits with opponents than supporters in 2010 [compared to the situation in 1960].” When demonization, hostility, and irrationality dominate public discourse, political tribalism and in-group/out-group bias are intensified. A discourse like this not only produces little consensus and progress but also promotes hatred and discontent. that always stubbornly depict those with different political viewpoints as devils and get everyone Even the trivial dispute of “should we keep the minimum wage where it is or raise it by three dollars per hour” will bog everyone down in endless war and curses (Brennan, 2016).

2.7 Ethnocentrism and Xenophobia: Flaws in Human Nature

People are born with the ability to alienate: six-month-old infants tend to associate negativity with people of other races (Xiao et al, 2017). The alienating nature has thrived in our genes through adaptation and evolution (Antal et al, 2009) because preference towards their own kind is a survival strength (De et al, 2015; Hartshorn, Kaznatcheev, & Shultz, 2013). One apparent reason is that people with similar genes tend to live together and be immune to a set of infectious diseases while vulnerable to others due to genetic composition and their environment, such as the types of surrounding livestock (Diamond, 2005), so empirically people tend to feel safer being around racially similar others. However, the more profound reason lies behind political dynamic and psychology. The ability to understand abstract concepts is what sets homo sapiens unique from other animals because common imagination can unite a large population and achieve large-scale cooperation (Harari, 2014). Therefore, leaders have been composing magnificent identities for their followers since the beginning of our history. However, apart from giving people a common belief of their uniqueness (for example, chosen people), luring people to hate and despise the outsiders (common enemy) is identically, if not more, important in terms of constituting identities and unity (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). As a result, humans became more and more ethnocentric and xenophobic both culturally and genetically in terms of their genes and social structure. This phenomenon is not limited to races; it also applies to cultures, morals, political systems, and even preferred football teams. Overt tribalism, identity politics, and ethnocentrism in modern political discussion is also a reflection of this.

However, this divisive nature is particularly exploited and amplified in the context of current identity politics as politicians in democracy take advantage of it for personal interests. As mentioned in 2.4, voters have no incentives to be impartial and engaged in politics; so politicians deploy tactics such as fear-mongering and political correctness to remind voters that “we are in crisis” and incite anger (Rubio, 2019). The instability and divisions resulted from apocalyptic narrative can be harmful to the country in the long term, but it would be a win for politicians if they get themselves in power by the campaign of identity politics. Social media also foster identity politics as it filters and personalizes realities by creating echo chambers for people to reinforce their pre-existing views and emotions (Bennett, 2012). Therefore, the system must be fundamentally changed to cope with identity politics and other twenty-first century challenges.

3 Epistocracy as a Better Alternative

Many alternatives of representative democracy with universal suffrage that sustain personal liberty have been proposed: Thomas Christiano (2008)’s values-only voting, Alexander Guerrero (2014)’s sortition and lottocracies, Robin Hanson (2013)’s futarchy or predictocracy, John Stuart Mill (1963)’s plural voting, and so on. One branch of alternatives is epistocracy, which is also the alternative this essay provides. The definition of epistocracy is “[a government where] political power is wielded by those who possess the knowledge relevant to good policymaking” (Mulligan, 2015). This is a broad definition, but before introducing the specific epistocracy this essay proposes, the essay will continue to explain the political reality of democracy with universal suffrage and articulate the arguments and counterarguments for epistocracy.

3.1 Hobbits, Hooligans, and Vulcans

Philip Converse (2000) concluded that “[t]he pithiest truth I have achieved about electorates is that where political information is concerned, the mean level is very low but the variance is very high.” Meanwhile, Jason Brennan (2016) explained this variation in detail and specify three types of citizens: hobbits, hooligans, and vulcans. Hobbits are mostly ignorant and indifferent about politics. They lack strong and fixed political opinions and do not vote regularly. Hooligans know and care more about politics, but their opinions and means to acquire information are highly biased. They can articulate their own arguments but often ignore or vilify the opposite arguments since “motivated reasoning” is their habits. Hooligans also make up most American voters. These two types of voters above are both the product of the rational irrationality of democracy. Vulcans, on the other hand, approach politics rationally and scientifically due to their interest, responsibility, or professions. They not only have strong arguments for themselves but also present their opponents’ arguments fairly. In the meantime, they have a large amount of social and political knowledge and information and are able to apply them. They respect others with different opinions but are unmotivated from politics because they are afraid of making incompetent decisions and/or disappointed with the political situation. Therefore, an epistocracy intends to diminish or eliminate the political influence of Hobbits and Hooligans while maximizes that of Vulcans. Brennan believed that better policies will be chosen in this case.

3.2 Correlation Between Demographic Features, Level of Information, and Policy Preference

The essay touched on this topic when addressing the demographic features of Trump’s supporters and leave voters. Another instance of the correlation between the level of information and policy preference is the attitude towards international trade. Voters of both countries demonstrated their preference for protectionism while Bryan Caplan (2007) noted that “few economists today, on either the left or the right, do not agree that the principle of comparative advantage indicates that citizens of both poor nations and rich nations stand to gain from international freedom of trade”. He also stressed that economists favor free market not “because of their social class”, “but because of their scholarly expertise” since “the typical wealthy, white, middle-aged Republican economist is still notably more pro-market than the typical wealthy, white, middle-aged, Republican noneconomist”.

Besides the Brexit referendum and Trump’s presidency, voters also have other systematic policy preferences based on their level of information (which is related to certain demographic features). Martin Gilens (2012) concludes that poor democrats “tend to be ignorant or misinformed” and they “more strongly approved of invading Iraq in 2003 . . . . the Patriot Act, invasions of civil liberty, torture, protectionism, and restricting abortion rights and access to birth control.”While the high-income and high-information Democrats not only hold the opposite views on the issues above but also support gay rights. More interestingly, another study found that political knowledge is positively correlated with “having a college degree . . . . being in the top half of income earner . . . . living in the western United States . . . . being or leaning Republican . . . . being between the ages of thirty-five and fifty-four.” Conversely, “[political knowledge] is negatively correlated with being black, and strongly negatively correlated to being female (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1991).”

More disturbingly, disadvantaged people commonly fail to improve their situation by voting; instead, the policy they favor tend to hurt themselves in the end. Another study by Althaus (2003) also finds that, regardless of their race, income or gender, poorly informed people are less supportive of abortion rights, moralistic in law, lenient measures on crime, free market approaches, dovish and interventionist foreign policy. Ironically, they will be precisely more vulnerable if their preferred policy is implemented. Similarly, although the top income earners benefited the most from US president Donald Trump’s tax proposal in 2017 (Holodny, 2017), the vast majority (78%) of the Republicans and 48% still supported it (Shepard, 2017). This polling also corresponds to Althaus (2003)’ finding that low-information people tend to oppose “using tax increases to offset the deficits and debt”. Perhaps, the American voters had mistaken the cause of their problem in the first place. Between 1962 and 2005, the steel industry lost 400,000 people, or 75% of its workforce to “a new technology for producing steel—the minimill” (Collard-Wexler & De Loecker, 2015), but many voters attributed the unemployment to China and voted for protectionism (Che et al, 2016), which, as mentioned, seems less appealing to the economists. Consequently, those who are in disadvantage may shoot themselves in the foot as a result of voting.

3.3 The Right to Competent Government

Jason Brennan (2016) also argues that “anyone or any deliberative body that exercises power over anyone else has an obligation to use that power in good faith, and has the obligation to use that power competently,” and “I can point to the average voter and reasonably ask, ‘Why should that person have any degree of power over me?’” He drew parallels between voters and drivers, plumbers, and doctors who all need licenses to practice their privilege/abilities. If the latter need some forms of examination, not to mention the former, who are impose their thoughts on others by the power of government.

Brennan (2016) also uses the analogy of a jury trial. If the jury find the defendant guilty because “[they] ignore the evidence presented” and make their decision by flipping a coin, they are ignorant.  If “[they] evaluate the evidence in cognitively biased, nonscientific, or even antiscientific ways,” they are irrational. If “they are cognitively impaired or the case is too complicated for their mental capacities,” they are impaired. If they find the defendant guilty because “the defendant is black, Jewish, Republican,” they are immoral. If they do so because “someone paid them each ten thousand dollars to do so,” they are corrupt. In these cases, it will be illegitimate to enforce the jury’s decision. Hence, suppose that certain voters are proven ignorant, irrational, impaired, immoral, or corrupt, their suffrage should also be restricted. Being competent does not authorize one to exercise power over others, but it is certainly reasonable to deprive one’s power over others on the ground of incompetency. 

3.4  Division of Labour Rather Than Two-Tier Citizenship

Certainly, there are arguments against epistocracy. An apparent one is that epistocracy will create two tiers of citizens and imply that one is better than the other. Brennan (2016) argued that although epistocracy will create two (or even more) classes of citizens in terms of their political rights and competence (which has already been accepted and practiced in democracies by restricting the voting age), it has nothing to do with their dignity and other rights as citizens. If one feel inferior because their right to vote is restricted, it is their own misfortune to relate the right to vote to personalities, self-esteem, or social status. Just as one needs not to be ashamed due to the lack of a medical, plumbing, or driving license since these certifications only represent specific abilities in the context of division of labour. Additionally, the fundamental assumption that every citizen should be a political animal is, in fact, unrealistic and even dangerous. As Brennan (2011) puts it: “[f]or citizens to acquire [knowledge of ‘an immense amount of social science’ and ‘of particular facts’] would require them to abandon the division of labour in society, so that they could all become political scientists, sociologists and economists.” One can be competent in other aspects and contribute his/her knowledge and skills to the society in other ways. Brennan (2016) also warned that “the mantra ‘Get out the vote! Every vote counts!’ is dangerous” because it will almost certainly “pollute the polls.” Finally, when voters are more accountable and competent, all members in the country—or outside of the country as well—will benefit from competent governance as they have the right to require so. 

3.4 A Better Approach to Social Disadvantages

One objection to epistocracy and restricted suffrage from David Estlund (2003) is “the demographic objection”— since there is systematic misinformation related to the demographics, Mill’s plural voting (voter education and examination in this case) will disadvantage the groups that have already been disadvantaged even more. Brennan (2016) started to counter this argument by examining the basic and widely accepted assumption behind it, which is that voters are able to utilize their votes for their benefits in the current democratic system. As mentioned in 3.3, this assumption is not true. Because of the lack of knowledge and information, the disadvantaged people are less competent to make good political choices and their may even hurt themselves by participating in voting. The hypothesis that politicians truthfully help their voters is only true when the voters are competent enough to differentiate between advantageous and harmful policies. In reality, politicians can draw supporters by promoting identity politics and escalating hatred as previous section mentioned.

Education has both accelerated the social mobility and boost the overall level of knowledge within a society, the problem of social exclusion and inequality should be expected to be solved in the same way. At the present time, socially disadvantaged students may see social and political scientific knowledge as worthless and lack the incentives to learn it as a result of their parents’ political inactivity (Kroh & Könnecke, 2014) or the financial uneasiness in their family. However, poverty can be inherited by making bad political decisions. Offering an opportunity for disadvantaged communities to acquire knowledge and information and perhaps further participate in politics more capably will create a positive response.

4 Voter Education and Examination

Bryan Caplan (2013) offered what he called “[a] cheap, inoffensive way to make democracy work better.” He suggested to implement a national “Voter Achievement Exam” each year, which is a voluntary test designed by the government that asks basic “questions about politics, economics, and policy.” What makes this test attractive is its rewards: “[p]articipants receive cash rewards based on their score.  E.g.: $1000 for 90%+, $500 for 80-89%, $100 for 70-79%, $0 for less.” The rewards also address the problem of rational irrationality as voters have an incentive to be informed and keep being informed. The implementation and management of this plan may be troublesome and costly, but it is worthy if it makes citizens significantly more informed and steers the country in the right direction.

This essay admires this proposal, but it intends to take it to the next level. It proposes a national voter education and examination system that is made free and accessible to every citizen. The education system is designed to educate citizens on being a competent voter, while the examination system serves the role to select competent voters. Citizens will not be granted the right to vote simply because they are citizens, they are required to pass the examination if they want to participate in politics by voting. In the following paragraphs, specific designs and advantages of voter education and examination system will be articulated.

4.1 A Basic Extension of Current Political Structure

Many alternatives of democracy with universal suffrage are distant from the public’s views and the current political system and their designs may be complex and difficult to understand. The voter education and examination may be an oversimplified and idealized alternative which is less academically attractive and sophisticated, but it is precisely the reason why every lay person can easily comprehend the purposes and functions of voter education and examination system. Readers of this essay likely have been or currently are in a formal educational system such as a secondary high school, college, or university. These institutions have shown their effectiveness in enlightening and informing students in specific areas throughout history and they are now expected to expand into a new field—basic political education for voters.

Voter education and examination require no thorough redesign of the entire political structure. As a basic extension of the democratic system, it is also flexible. The final exam can be so simple that 90% of the participants can pass it. On the other hand, it may require university-level knowledge which is difficult even for students majoring in political or social science. The number of qualifiers is also flexible depending on the exam content and this essay does not intend to offer a specific number or percentage of qualifiers.

4.2 Voting: A Privilege Instead of a Right 

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (as well as the constitutions in other democracies) defines voting as a right, but this article suggests an amendment—reclassifying voting as a privilege. Constitutional rights like the freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression are granted since one is born (reaches eighteen years old for voting), while privileges such as driving have to be acquired with individuals’ effort and regulated strictly by the government. A driver in a vehicle is “legally required to show [his/her] licence, vehicle registration and insurance” (Tchir, 2016) when he/she is pulled over by the police, while persons walking on the street are not legally required to show ID or answer questions unless they are “under investigation for a crime or suspected of committing another offense” (Bennett, 2015). As driving is an act that will potentially and directly harm others to a great extent, drivers have to pass driving tests and they are given more obligation as well. 

To suit the appetites of the mass majority of the voters, suffrage is defined as a tool to protect one’s own benefits and voting is regarded as a virtue. However, the danger of misusing this tool is not stressed enough. Voters are the origin of power and they are entitled to impose the government’s absolute force on innocent people without the latter’s consent. Both the design of universal suffrage and politicians failed to remind voters of their responsibility to vote competently, while voter education and examination tries to emphasize it. It is also noteworthy that currently, people under 18 years old do not have the right to vote, which officially confirms voting’s potential danger to the society. On the other hand, it also clarifies that the question is not if we can prohibit someone from voting, but for what reasons we can prohibit someone from voting. The implication under excluding kids and teenagers from voting is an application of the “competence principle” which is defined by Brennan (2018) as “anyone or any deliberative body that exercises power over anyone else has an obligation to use that power in good faith, and has the obligation to use that power competently.” Therefore, making voting a privilege rather than a right acknowledges the responsibility and danger of voting and protects the public from the pernicious effect of incompetent voters.

4.3 Universal Teaching to the Test: Minimize Bias

Exemplified by gerrymandering, politicians who are in power often skew the political system for their own interest. Education is undoubtedly a sensitive tool that numerous forces want to have a hand on, as it largely influences the mindsets of the future generations. Other than politicians, teachers may also be a source of political bias, usually out of reasons that are justified to themselves. Even the charismatic and self-righteous students can affect their classmates impressively. Compared to the educational systems in East Asian countries, the Western ones emphasize more on both the teachers’ and the students’ freedom, which, in essence, is extremely dangerous for the voter education and examination.

Like Caplan’s “Voter Achievement Exam,” the voter education and examination will be nationally universal to minimize bias. Canadian students will receive standardized textbooks and other course materials examined by specific apartments with proper public consultation. Both the teachers or the students will be limited to express their personal viewpoints. The teaching approach will be similar to the one in mathematics course rather than in a political science course; in other words, it will be a “teaching to the test” where the curriculum heavily focuses on preparing students for a standardized test and memorizing is the most important task. Besides minimizing bias, standardized teaching is also the most efficient and information-dense educational method and it can provide high quality and easily accessible education to all citizens. Meanwhile, memorizing and understanding course content are the only requirement while unrelated skills such as presentation skills and video-editing skills are not a part of the criteria.

4.4 The Great Displacement: A Better Political Structure for the Future

Andrew Yang (2018), a 2020 democratic U.S. presidential candidates, predicted that we are going through the greatest technological and economic change in human history. He is referring to the Fourth Industrial Revolution driven by artificial intelligence and automation that will put the vast majority of people out of work, which he called “the Great Displacement” in his book The War on Normal People. Yang (2017) often cited two studies: one from Ball State University that showed 87.8% of manufacturing job loss in the United States from 2000 to 2010 were lost due to automation (Hicks & Devaraj, 2015); the other from the Obama White House that suggested that “83% of jobs where people make less than $20 per hour will be subject to automation or replacement” (Executive Office of the President, 2016). He is proposing a universal basic income of 1000 dollars per month for all adult Americans to counter mass unemployment caused by “the Great Displacement.”

This essay regards Yang’s depiction of the future as accurate and believes that some version of universal basic income will be implemented in the near future. Under this context, one implication is that people will have a lot of free time to engage in and master the voter education and examination system. Another implication is that most citizens who are no longer actively involved in the labour market will start to lose track of the latest technologies and the core of the country’s economy under the current political system. As the gap between the knowers and the uninformed will be huge and the latter will be incompetent and powerless to guide the whole country, the voter education and examination system is crucial to keep the citizens up to date and ensure the quality of voters.

4.5 Suggested Content in Voter Education and Examination

Eventually, the success or failure of the voter education depends upon the content and the social context. Literacy tests had been used as a type of voter examination in America; in practice, however, immigrants and the poor were unproportionally disqualified because of their lesser degree of education rather than their discrepancy in political knowledge (Garcia, 1974). Excluding certain groups of people from voting based on their race instead of their competency is unmistakably inappropriate, but it does not sentence all kinds of voter education and examination to death. The system this essay proposed intended to give everyone regardless of their gender, sex, age, income, religion, and race an equal chance to participate and pass the examination both in its design and practice.

Another simpler form of political education (which is not associated with suffrage) in the American history resulted from the progressive education movement in the 1920s; it recommended learning democratic and civil spirit and virtues directly in the school (Hofstadter, 1963). This method was expected to reinforce democracy and educate the students to be good citizens. However, the education of history and political science were reduced because Americans at that time regarded these subjects unhelpful for democratic citizens, while learning how to live everyday life was considered more important than learning geography. Yet the social, political, economic issues nowadays are more complex and require interdisciplinary knowledge. For now, this specific essay proposes five aspects of content in the voter education and examination:

1. The philosophy and ethics of voting: Such an education intends to stress the moral obligation. Voters have to acknowledge their responsibilities and personally believe that their votes will benefit the community as a whole. To avoid redundancy, the inference will not be presented again. People have different criteria for national benefits, some may argue that the national benefits are consistent with self-interests, others may even favor other species over humans. Nonetheless, to fulfil their responsibilities, they should have strong arguments for their theories and be able to deal with basic counter-arguments.
2. Reasoning skills: Reasoning skills include the skills of logical reasoning, information analysis, the use of examples, and so on. In-class formal debate is not suggested, but the study of reasoning skills helps students identify common logic errors, improve their critical thinking abilities, and distinguish whether a person has proved their thesis successfully. 
3. Political structures: When voting on political officials, voters should be able to clearly articulate the power and duty in these positions. Likewise, they should understand the function of and the relation between the three (executive, legislative, and judicial) branches of power. Political structures have already been a topic in civic courses, it should not be surprising that they will also be in the curriculum of the voter education.
4. Social and political science: This is a broad category which is also associated with history, geography, economy, law, and philosophy. Such education is the focus of the voter education and examination since raising the level of social and political scientific knowledge and information will engender better policies. Similarly, high schools are teaching this in social scientific courses, but the content should be deeper, wider, and analytical. Facts and previous researches of current issues should also be presented detailedly—which may cause some controversie; therefore, the curriculum should not directly judge the correctness of all the sensitive issues. For example, the curriculum should not state that racism is wrong (although that is what many teachers are doing now), but it can explain that the basic assumption of common forms of racism is that there is a significant cognitive difference between races and it purely results from the racial genes, which is simply not scientifically or evidently supported. Some may argue that the government or political parties should always be entirely neutral on these issues when educating the children, yet this is hardly achievable. Almost every educational system in the world implies that murdering, raping, or stealing is immoral and evil, which may not be the case in extreme situations; however, children should accept these dogmas in general and reason on their own afterward. It is not catastrophic for a political party that is in power to convey certain ideas as long as there is a space for everyone else to discuss them. Instead, the government should take a more aggressive approach and participates in the “market of notions,” leaving the arguments to the media and individuals.
5. Basic information of the candidates and their policies: Before every election, voters should be additionally tested for their comprehension of who and what they are voting for.

Conclusion

Winston Churchill once said: “democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (“The worst form of Government,” 2016), yet there are some forms of government that had not been tried. Only if people are open-minded to the possibilities of better political systems, the progress of human civilization can be made. A successful voter education and examination system not only improves a country’s political decision-making and produces better results, it increases the overall level of knowledge in a country and enable its citizens to better cope with new challenges. Most importantly, it corrects the systematic flaw of rational irrationality in electorate democracy, stresses the responsibility of votes, and truly paves the road for rational and respectful political discourse as proponents of deliberative democracy endorses. If the illustration of voter education and examination in this essay is sound, pilot projects should be implemented. As suggested by Brennan (2011), in the case of the United States, experiment of restricted suffrage (his design of the restricted suffrage system may be different than the one this essay suggests) “would . . . be better to start with a relatively non-corrupt state, such as New Hampshire, rather than a corrupt state, such as Rhode Island.” In the end, it should also be kept in mind that the voter education and examination system should be implemented through current democratic procedures when a general consensus of its value is reached by the general society and the content should be regularly revisited and agreed upon by government institutions in accordance to the general public.

—-Atlas, 2019.12.2

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